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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2590th MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 14 June 1985, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Errol MAHABIR (Trinidad and Tobago).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Burkina Faso, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Madagascar, Peru, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2590)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17213);
   (*b*) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17222);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/17242)

The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17213);
(*b*) Letter dated 23 May 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/17222);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/17242)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite the representative of Liberia to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Kofa (Liberia) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite the Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ouyahia, Acting President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the other members of the delegation took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2583rd meeting, I invite Mr. Nujoma to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2583rd to 2587th and 2589th meetings*], I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, the Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, Zambia and Zimbabwe to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Bessaieh (Algeria), Mr. Van-Dunem (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Choudhury (Bangladesh), Mr. Tshering (Bhutan), Mrs. Carrasco (Bolivia), Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. Maciel (Brazil), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Mboumoua (Cameroon), Mr. Lewis (Canada), Mr. Gayama (Congo), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. César (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Dinka (Ethiopia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. Lautenschlager (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Asamoah (Ghana), Mr. Karran (Guyana), Mr. Charles (Haiti), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Kiilu (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mr. Vongsay (Lao People's Democratic Republic), Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),

Mr. Zain (Malaysia), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Nyamdoo (Mongolia), Mr. Alaoui (Morocco), Mr. Murargy (Mozambique), Mr. D'Escoto Brockmann (Nicaragua), Mr. Gambari (Nigeria), Mr. Shah Nawaz (Pakistan), Mr. Cabrera Jovane (Panama), Mr. Nowak (Poland), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Wijewardane (Sri Lanka), Mr. Birido (Sudan), Mr. Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Türkmen (Turkey), Mr. Odaka (Uganda), Mr. Al-Mosfir (United Arab Emirates), Mr. Mkapa (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia), Mr. Goma (Zambia) and Mr. Mudenge (Zimbabwe) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Barbados and Lesotho in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moseley (Barbados) and Mr. Makeka (Lesotho) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them document S/17270, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by Burkina Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago.

7. If the Council will allow me to be a bit parochial, I wish to indicate that the first speaker inscribed on my list is a friend and colleague from the Caribbean, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Jamaica, Mr. Hugh Shearer, who has played a major role in the development of that region and an even more major role in the whole question of decolonization. I welcome him and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. SHEARER (Jamaica): Let me begin by expressing my delegation's sincere appreciation for the opportunity afforded me to participate in these meetings of the Council devoted to the question of Namibia.

9. My delegation takes special pride and satisfaction in noting that the proceedings of the Council for the month of June are being presided over by you, Sir, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, a member of the family of the English-speaking Caribbean and a country with which Jamaica enjoys close and cordial relations. Trinidad and Tobago can be proud of its record of active involvement in the work of the United Nations system. On this occasion we recall especially the noteworthy contributions which your country has made as a member of the Special Committee against *Apartheid* and of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. My delegation reposes great confidence in your proven abilities to guide the deliberations of the Council with judgement, competence and skill.

10. I should also like to pay special tribute to the representative of Thailand for the capable, efficient and purposeful manner in which he conducted the work of the Council during the month of May.

11. The history of Namibia is the courageous struggle of a people that has persevered in the face of tremendous obstacles towards the fulfilment of its legitimate aspirations for freedom, justice and self-determination.

12. I recall the statement of Mr. Toivo Ya Toivo, founder of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), before the Court at his trial in 1968 on a terrorism charge. He said:

> "You, my Lord, decided that you had the right to try us because your Parliament gave you that right. That ruling has not and could not have changed our feelings. We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and will not in the future, recognize your right to govern us, to make laws for us in which we had no say, to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country. This is how we have always felt and this is how we feel now, and it is on this basis that we have faced this trial."

In continuing his testimony, the Namibian patriot further stated:

> "I have come to know that our people cannot expect progress as a gift from anyone, be it the United Nations or South Africa. Progress is something we shall have to struggle and work for."

Those words remain as true today as when they were spoken 17 years ago.

13. The Council has once again been convened to consider the grave situation in and around Namibia, and in the context of a further deterioration of the situation in southern Africa.

14. Yet, at the very moment that we are meeting here, the South African régime stands poised and ready to complete its long-established plans to annex the Territory of Namibia. What we are now witnessing is the end of the first stage of this insidious scheme, evidenced in the establishment of the so-called interim administration in Namibia with the connivance of the puppet Multi-Party Conference.

15. That decision has, deservedly, been soundly condemned and rejected by the international community at large, including the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the members of the Council. Nonetheless, the Pretoria régime remains unrepentant and brazenly defiant of the will of the international community.

16. By now, the international community should have become fully aware of that régime's well-established record of deception, intransigence and prevarication. Pretoria has now brought forward its plans for the complete integration of the Namibian economy into that of South Africa, so as to effect its unimpeded control over Namibia's natural resources.

17. The Jamaican delegation has been increasingly concerned at South Africa's continued illegal exploitation and plunder of Namibia's natural resources, including the Territory's marine resources, which have been taking place with the participation of some transnational corporations. We regard those activities as a flagrant violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,[1] enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia. Those activities are also contrary to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice rendered in June 1971,[2] declaring South Africa's presence in Namibia to be illegal.

18. Furthermore, the Council, in resolution 283 (1970), had, *inter alia*, called upon all States

> "to discourage their nationals or companies of their nationality not under direct governmental control from investing or obtaining concessions in Namibia, and to this end to withhold protection of such investment against claims of a future lawful government of Namibia".

19. Yet the United Nations Council for Namibia, in its report to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly,[3] noted that there was still a large number of foreign economic interests and transnational corporations active in the exploitation of Namibia's resources. They include some of the world's largest corporations and financial institutions from South Africa, Western Europe and North America. The economic activities of those companies involve the mining and exploitation of a wide range of Namibia's precious resources, including diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, zinc, manganese and other metals. They have also gained control over Namibia's agricultural and fishing resources and are now exploring for oil.

20. According to the records, for example, some 199,000 metric tons of uranium oxide, copper and lead, and over 1 million carats of diamonds were mined in Namibia in 1982.

21. These corporations conduct their occupations under licenses issued by the colonial occupying Power. They have been lured to Namibia by the unusually high profits made available by South Africa's extension to that Territory of the *apartheid* system, which essentially guarantees these foreign economic interests an abundance of bridled labour. And what profits! We are told, for example, that the 1982 profits from the Rössing uranium mine were 91.2 million pounds sterling, the second largest contribution to the profits of its parent multinational corporation. We are also told that the shameless level of over-fishing that is being practised by South African and other interests in Namibian waters has already led to a decline in the fishery resources and to the laying off of large numbers of black workers. The profits from this exploitation are, of course, exported, while the losses remain in Namibia.

22. What all this means is that the natural resources of the country, and in particular the non-renewable resources, are being mercilessly plundered by South Africa to support its oppressive régime, while South Africa continues to defy the resolutions of the Security Council.

23. Blacks, who constitute 95 per cent of the population engaged in agriculture, have been confined to a wholly marginalized existence. They are mainly subsistence farmers, and their share of the total marketed agricultural output is only about 2.5 per cent.

24. The existence of onerous registration laws has made it almost impossible for black trade unions to register, and overwhelming obstacles to effective union organization and activity still persist. Laws explicitly forbid the trade unions from pursuing political objectives, and even the slightest suggestion of such action has led to outright bans on union activity.

25. The subjugated population has virtually no possibilities for ensuring the free exercise of its inalienable right of self-determination. Its basic human rights and dignity continue to be violated and abused under the might of the colonial occupying Power.

26. Since the last series of Council meetings on Namibia, in 1983, there have been two distinct trends: the first has been the persistent but insidious attempt to make Namibia's independence a secondary issue; the second is the increasingly intimate relationship between Namibia's future and the struggle of the people in South Africa itself to destroy the *apartheid* system.

27. The recent cycle of violence unleashed by the Pretoria régime against the opponents of *apartheid* in South Africa has now spread all over the country, to numerous townships and villages, and causes us great concern. A campaign of terror and naked violence is being waged by the security forces of the racist régime in an effort to suppress the mounting domestic opposition to *apartheid*.

28. While Pretoria pursues its relentless campaign aimed at suppressing domestic opposition and at reversing the forces of change, the régime has also stepped up its activities of subversion and destablization of the Governments of the front-line States.

29. Repression at home and aggression abroad are two facets of a strategy of propping up the régime's minority rule at home in order to guarantee the continuation of white supremacy and domination of the region. The constant acts of military aggression and harassment against the front-line States are aimed at undermining them in order to create a constellation of weak, dependent and politically subservient States in the region. Namibia fits into that scheme. The latest example of this was yesterday's incursion by South Africa into Botswana and the murder by South Africa's forces of innocent citizens, including children.

30. In the face of South Africa's bad faith and obvious intentions, the international community has been hesitant, timid and equivocal. Pretoria has been left free to persist in aggressive actions which defy the most elementary principles of international conduct and civilized behaviour. For far too long, some have allowed themselves to be deceived into accepting the mistaken notion that Pretoria could somehow be coaxed into negotiating in good faith an end to the vicious system of *apartheid* or into fulfilling its commitments regarding Namibia's independence.

31. It is precisely such gravely misplaced and ill-conceived assumptions that have rendered the United Nations virtually immobile and impotent in the face of an evil and reprehensible régime ever willing to use naked military terror to maintain its racist domination of the region. This is a régime of terrorists.

32. In the meantime, Namibia's future has been compromised and heavily mortgaged. Pretoria's intransigence has been rewarded with concession after concession. The international standing and prestige of the Western contact group which had entrusted itself with the responsibility for Namibia's independence has been irreparably tarnished. The contact group itself has become moribund and its activities overtaken by a bilateral dialogue and contact with South Africa, purportedly with a view to persuading South Africa to "reform" *apartheid* and to grant independence to Namibia.

33. It must be frankly acknowledge that the policy of constructive engagement has failed to yield any fruitful results and may in fact have been counter-productive in terms of net progress achieved. Events have vividly demonstrated that Pretoria has instead skilfully manipulated this policy in pursuit of its devious manoeuvres in the region while hatching new schemes further to entrench the *apartheid* system.

34. All this points to the urgency of restoring the authority of the United Nations and bringing concerted pressure to bear on the Pretoria intransigents.

35. We are gratified to note the insistent demands in a number of countries for economic disinvestment by multinational corporations in South Africa, and for the imposition of a trade embargo. This has come about in the face of the recent wave of repression against the people of South Africa and the failure of diplomatic efforts to produce any meaningful change in the *apartheid* system.

36. In response to Pretoria's repeated acts of violence and aggression in the region, we join in demanding that the Council take the appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by imposing comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against the régime. Pending the imposition of mandatory sanctions, the Jamaican delegation urges that the constructive and realistic programme of action adopted by the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Namibia, held at New Delhi from 19 to 21 April last [*see S/17184 and Corr.1, annex*] be immediately implemented. In particular, we strongly support the call for the severance of all diplomatic relations with South Africa, economic disinvestment programmes, the full observance of an oil embargo and strict enforcement of the mandatory arms embargo. We also endorse the call to observe the sports and cultural boycott of South Africa.

37. Jamaica attaches particular importance to the provision of educational and training opportunities for young Namibians, as being essential and complementary to the activities of the United Nations aimed at securing independence and self-determination for the Namibian people. We therefore fully support the proposals for more scholarships and training opportunities for Namibian students through the United Nations Fund for Namibia and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa. We further believe that the provision of such humanitarian assistance is of crucial importance in preparing the Namibians to assume their future administrative responsibilities in the Territory.

38. Finally, I wish to take the opportunity of renewing Jamaica's unswerving and committed support for the courageous struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence and to their legitimate representative, SWAPO. Jamaica will never recognize the so-called interim government, and we will never ease our own sanctions against South Africa so long as Namibia remains under South African domination, and so long as the abomination that is *apartheid* continues to be practised by the South African régime.

39. Mr. RABETAFIKA (Madagascar) (*interpretation from French*): As the representative of a country that, like most of our countries, faces urgent and difficult problems, you have done us the honour, Sir, for the second time this year, despite your heavy responsibilities, of sharing in our concerns and giving us the benefit of your experience as a statesman. We are grateful to you, especially since your presidency coincides with consideration of a question with regard to which Trinidad and Tobago, on its own behalf and on behalf of the international community, has traditionally played a decisive role.

40. I should like through you, Sir, to express the sincere thanks of my delegation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the representative of Thailand, Mr. Birabhongse Kasemsri, for the effective, constructive and always courteous way in which they conducted our work last month.

41. The case against South Africa is so strong that one meeting of the Council would not be enough to go through it all, and each delegation would need several meetings to air its grievances, denounce South Africa's extortion and injustices and try—if it is possible—to get the authorities in Pretoria to see reason. We might then be accused of allowing ourselves to be guided by emotion and of trying to be sensational, and of not being sufficiently realistic in adopting a more rational attitude. Such accusations are familiar to us. We have been listening to them for more than 20 years—in fact, since the Organization of African Unity decided to take the lead in concerted action in the Security Council against the false democracy pursued by the racist Pretoria régime in both South Africa and Namibia.

42. Let us therefore proceed on the basis of the realities, those that we have to bear in mind at the United Nations in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions or decisions of the Organization. Those realities are: the continuing illegal occupation of Namibia, the United Nations plan for the Territory's independence and our responsibility towards the Namibian people.

43. No member of the Council can deny the illegality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia. Neither can anyone reasonably deny that this is a case in which decolonization was ill prepared for, because of a desire to cater to the interests of certain circles. We might be tempted to set aside the decisions of the Organization and the opinions of the International Court of Justice, because it is not always easy for a colonial Power to accept that international public opinion should decide the principle and methods of an act of decolonization, unless that Power is forced to do so by special circumstances or agrees to honour its own commitments and traditions.

44. However, what does Pretoria have to offer in the way of traditions—except *apartheid*? We all know—some of us may choose to ignore it—that *apartheid* is characterized by contempt for, and the rejection of, others, and ignorance of realities resulting from obscurantist fundamentalism, a desire to dominate, an arrogant illiberalism and elitism, all of which have prompted the régime to believe that it has a monopoly of reason and truth.

45. The system of *apartheid* is clearly odious and reprehensible. But when it comes to its foundations and outward signs, statements on the subject—for fear of opening a Pandora's box,—are no longer clear-cut or unanimous. Hence one can readily understand why South Africa continues with impunity its illegal occupation of Namibia, as that occupation could become a privileged presence on its own behalf or on behalf of others. That, however, is not the United Nations understanding of decolonization, and we have no choice but to reject categorically any attempt to have it believed that the Pretoria régime can be a constructive element in Namibia and southern Africa as a whole.

46. Another reality is the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. The announcement of the setting up of a so-called interim government is a serious challenge to that plan which, in any case, South Africa no longer mentions. Instead, there is talk of an agreement on internationally acceptable independence resulting from "international negotiations" to which, as we understand it, the United Nations is not invited. Can the Pretoria régime tell us whether it is still bound by the principles set out in resolution 435 (1978) and the methods worked out and accepted at the cost of important mutual concessions?

47. In truth, anything that concerns South Africa is reduced to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and one can easily imagine that the establishment of an interim government is a manoeuvre to prompt the international community to agree to the link of such a withdrawal to Namibian independence. The Council cannot go along with this kind of blackmail because we cannot impose upon a sovereign country the means to ensure its security and fight against destabilization and aggression, convincing proof of which was given to us on 21 May last in northern Angola and yesterday in the capital of Botswana. It goes without saying that the choice of these means cannot be incompatible with the requirements of international or regional international peace and security. It is not the legal and legitimate presence of Cuban forces in Angola that is endangering peace and security, but the constant defiance of the United Nations by South Africa.

48. In spite of its claims of good faith, by which South Africa in its cynicism would have us believe that a peaceful settlement or dialogue among the parties or equal treatment is possible, it is obvious that the Pretoria régime is determined to create pseudo-independence for Namibia allowing it to maintain its hegemony in southern Africa which we must recognize or be accused of partiality. We reject this so-called programme, which is presented to justify certain *faits accomplis* and is based on the abandonment of certain commitments, this paranoiac crusade which has no place in the United Nations and this gross interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.

49. We must now consider our responsibility *vis-à-vis* the Namibians, who are authentically and legitimately represented by SWAPO. Without citing the principles and declarations with which we are all familiar and which we all without question intend to respect, we would observe that this responsibility cannot be honoured if we do not insist on the immediate and full implementation of resolution 435 (1978). We have gone beyond the stage where we can hide behind the complexity of the problem or the need to have time and opinion work in our favour.

50. For political reasons and reasons of principle, we are committed to Namibian independence, for we are convinced that under the South African administration the objectives of the trusteeship system, as set forth in Article 76 of the Charter, cannot be reached. That commitment is firm, and it cannot change with circumstance. Namibians can be patient, but they will never understand why their political, economic and social liberation must be made dependent on foreign interests that are mainly interested in plunder.

51. Over the past few years there has been much talk about the credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council. Those two virtues are being contested by the very people we encouraged to come under our protection. The choices before us are limited indeed: either we stick to our plan and reject anything that might water it down or counter it and take appropriate action in that connection or we leave Namibians to their fate and recognize the absurd claims of the *apartheid* régime, which might lead to a unilateral declaration of independence by a puppet régime, or again we could accept that SWAPO and the United Nations Council for Namibia should declare that the Territory is independent and that it is our duty to consolidate that independence and to defend it against the reactions of South Africa or reactions from any other quarter.

52. The debate is far from over. For the time being we can agree to consider that the first choice is the best one, and that involves the question of comprehensive, binding sanctions. To how many warnings is South Africa entitled? How many times must we meet to consider and reconsider what action might be appropriate under Chapter VII of the Charter? Must we again hear the same arguments that were given to us 20 years ago about the ineffectiveness of sanctions and their harmful effects upon African populations and mutinational corporations? Will we have the understanding of some of our negotiating partners who have suggested that it might be preferable to consider selective, voluntary sanctions? These are all questions that might receive embarrassing replies.

53. When we mention sanctions, it is not out of irresponsibility or because we have an unhealthy preference for them. In the circumstances, they are the only way for the United Nations to rid itself of ambiguity, to test the political or moral powers of the Organization in the face of abusive preservation of colonialism, expansion, exploitation and domination on the part of the *apartheid* régime. If we opt for sanctions, world public opinion, which is increasingly enlightened and committed, will no longer accuse us of powerlessness behind which we hide modestly, as if we feared reality. If we refuse sanctions, the only beneficiary will be South Africa, and that will mean we have failed the Namibians, who have asked us, like the pilgrims of Emmaus, to stay with them because it is getting late.

54. These are the realities. No trick of reasoning can conceal them. No *a posteriori* justification of a deliberate policy of surrender can make anyone forget them. No attempt to appease the *apartheid* régime will conceal those realities. It is up to us to make our choice, but let it not be said that the United Nations is doomed to failure in Namibia.

55. Mr. OUDOVENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): At the outset I wish to welcome you, Sir, to the presidency. We have already this week had a chance to see for ourselves how your great diplomatic and political experience has been helpful to the work of the Council. Although the Ukraine and Trinidad and Tobago are separated by a great distance, our delegations are neighbours, not just here in the Security Council but also in many other important organs of the United Nations system—for example, in the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, which at this moment is holding a solemn meeting devoted to the International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa, who are fighting for their freedom and independence, and to put an end to the ignominious system of *apartheid*. Allow me, Sir, to wish you the best of success in your work as President.

56. I should like also to express our gratitude to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the representative of Thailand for performing in an exemplary manner their duties last month, which was quite a difficult month in the work of the Council.

57. The high level of the representation of many non-aligned countries during the entire course of the discussion in the Council emphasizes the gravity of the situation in southern Africa and shows convincingly that the question of the granting of independence to Namibia is one of the most acute and pressing problems of our day.

58. The illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa has been under discussion by the United Nations for many years. As has already been pointed out, the Security Council alone has adopted 22 resolutions on this question.

59. However, notwithstanding the demands of the United Nations for the unconditional liberation of Namibia, the Pretoria racists have extended to that Territory a colonial and racist system and have been subjecting the Namibian people to harsh terror and repression, trying to crush their desire for freedom and independence. They have turned Namibia into an appendage of the South African economy, designating it as a supplier of raw materials, and have been trying by every possible means to retain their rule over that Territory. The Pretoria racists have established in Namibia a military and strategic beachhead for their aggressive and subversive actions against neighbouring African States which, with every justification, are known as the front-line States.

60. The General Assembly has repeatedly pointed out that the illegal colonial occupation of Namibia by South Africa, in violation of numerous decisions of the United Nations, constitutes an act of aggression against the people of Namibia and poses a grave threat to international peace and security as a whole.

61. The United Nations, which bears direct responsibility for the fate of Namibia and for its decolonization, has long ago defined in a number of resolutions, first and foremost in Security Council resolution 435 (1978), realistic ways to bring about Namibia's independence and autonomous development and a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem.

62. Nevertheless, this acute problem still remains unresolved. The illegal occupation of Namibia continues and the Security Council resolutions remain unfulfilled. Spurning the will of the international community and blatantly trampling underfoot the Charter of the United Nations, the Pretoria régime has stubbornly refused to leave Namibia. As can be seen from the further report of the Secretary-General, Pretoria has been sabotaging the settlement of the Namibian problem and the implementation of the United Nations plan by piling up various artificial obstacles to it. As the report says, moreover,

> "The prevailing difficulties have been compounded and given a new dimension by the recent decision of South Africa to establish an interim government in Namibia." [*S/17242, para. 47.*]

63. Those who have spoken before me have already exposed the true essence of the infamous internal settlement plan by means of which Pretoria seeks to impose upon Namibia a neo-colonialist model to hold on to its rule there and prevent SWAPO from assuming power in the country.

64. While hypocritically stating, together with its chief protector, the United States, the need for reconciliation in southern Africa, Pretoria in actual fact has not halted its attempts to destabilize the situation in neighbouring independent States but has been pursuing a policy of armed aggression against them. The aggression against Angola has not been halted either. The representative of Angola has cited convincing facts in the Council [*2586th meeting*] in that regard and in particular the recent attack by saboteurs from Pretoria against facilities in the northern part of his country. Thus Pretoria's statements of its so-called peaceful intentions in respect of Angola have proved to be lies and mere propaganda manoeuvres. This is how South Africa carries out its widely publicized agreements and arrangements.

65. The threat from South Africa against the front-line States, including the threat from the Territory of Namibia, which is illegally occupied by Pretoria, has not diminished; on the contrary, it has increased.

66. The question arises in this connection: Why do the racists behave so brazenly? Why do they trample underfoot the Charter and spurn the decisions of the United Nations? The responsibility for this lies with those circles, particularly the United States, which have been actively co-operating with South Africa and providing it with comprehensive support and assistance, while here in the Council shielding the racists from the implementation of international sanctions against them.

67. The United States and Pretoria have for some years been carrying on a diplomatic game in order to settle the Namibian problem by means of behind-the-scene manoeuvres, in circumvention of the United Nations, jeopardizing the interests of the people of Namibia but satisfying the interests of the racists, and trying to force the African peoples to reconcile themselves to the preservation of a bastion of colonialism in southern Africa under a new label. It is precisely the desire of the United States and South Africa to supplant the granting of genuine independence and freedom to Namibia by a neo-colonialist variant, together with the broad assistance to South Africa from the United States, certain other Western countries and Israel in the political, economic, military and nuclear spheres that are the basic reasons why United Nations decisions on Namibia remain unfulfilled today.

68. The Ukraine entirely shares the concern about the situation in Namibia expressed in the final document adopted by the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries on the question of Namibia, held at New Delhi from 19 to 21 April last [*S/17184 and Corr.1, annex*]. We agree with the evaluation of the existing situation given in that document and its assessment of the reasons why Namibia has not yet become independent. The Ukraine most resolutely condemns and repudiates the new devious ploys of the South African régime designed to reinforce its illegal occupation of Namibia in violation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

69. The present machinations of the Pretoria racists designed to preserve in disguised form their rule over Namibia are no more legitimate than the entirely worthless, invalid and infamous "new constitution" of South Africa. The new manoeuvre of the *apartheid* régime is a grave violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, which have emphasized that any unilateral measure adopted by the unlawful occupation régime in Namibia is invalid. The Council must resolutely repudiate this latest anti-popular action by South Africa as invalid, unlawful and wholly lacking in effect and must call upon all countries to refuse to recognize such a "settlement".

70. We entirely share the opinion of the non-aligned countries, once more confirmed at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of New Delhi, and also expressed during these discussions, to the effect that the Council must immediately take appropriate measures under the Charter, including the application of Chapter VII. Realistic and effective measures against South Africa, which should be taken before the implementation by the Council of comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter, have been proposed, for example, in the Declaration, adopted on 28 March of this year, of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*[4] and also in the Programme of Action approved at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of New Delhi, to which I have already referred [*ibid.*]. The Ukraine supports the implementation of those measures.

71. It is essential to overcome the obstructionist position adopted by certain Western countries on this question. It is only through the co-ordinated and joint efforts of all States towards the total isolation of the racists in the international arena that it will be possible to achieve by peaceful means the speedy elimination of the last remaining outpost of colonialism in southern Africa.

72. The Ukraine resolutely calls for the prompt exercise by the Namibian people of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence, in a united and territorially intact State, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands. We also advocate the transfer of full powers to the people of Namibia, through their sole authentic representative, SWAPO.

73. As we have already emphasized, the only realistic and agreed-upon way to settle the Namibian problem and ensure the attainment of independent and autonomous development for Namibia has been laid down in United Nations decisions on the question, in particular Security Council resolution 435 (1978).

74. Guided by its principled position, the Ukraine will continue its support for the struggle of the valiant people of Namibia, headed by SWAPO, for their liberation.

75. Last week I returned from Geneva, where, as the representative of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, I took part in the International Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations devoted to the struggle against racism, *apartheid*, and the vestiges of colonialism, which was organized in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples. Many non-governmental organizations from various countries round the world took part in the work of the Conference, which adopted a statement addressed to the Security Council, declaring, *inter alia*, that

> "Alarmed by the attempts of the Pretoria régime to implement its plans to set up a so-called interim government in Namibia, the participants in the Conference condemn and repudiate these plans and confirm their full support for the speedy implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia approved in Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They confirm their clear position that SWAPO is the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people."

Those words are further evidence that the peoples of all countries advocate the prompt granting to Namibia of genuine independence and the definitive elimination of racism, racial discrimination and colonial dependence.

76. It is now incumbent upon the Council to adopt effective measures for the speedy attainment of these noble goals.

77. We support the draft resolution in document S/17270.

78. Mr. KASEMSRI (Thailand): Permit me at the outset, Sir, to say how happy and privileged my delegation feels to see you, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, presiding over these important meetings. I have just returned from a visit to your country, and I nostalgically recall the verdant and vibrant beauty of your land and the gracefulness and friendliness of your people. I wish to express my delegation's sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June. My delegation is confident that, with your diplomatic skills, experience and statesmanship, the deliberations of the Council will yield fruitful results.

79. This is the second time within two months that the Council is seized of the question of Namibia. On 3 May the President of the Council issued, on behalf of its members, a statement [*S/17151*] expressing its indignation and grave concern over the latest action taken by South Africa to establish the so-called interim government in Namibia, which is contrary to the expressed will of the international community and in defiance of the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978), which declared such unilateral measures to be null and void. The statement also called upon South Africa to rescind the action and to co-operate in, and facilitate the implementation of, the United Nations plan as contained in resolution 435 (1978).

80. Thailand attaches great importance to the question of Namibia. Our support and sympathy reside fully with the Namibian people, which is waging a just struggle against the Pretoria régime to gain its freedom and independence. Thailand was pleased to host the meetings of the United Nations Council for Namibia in May 1984 at Bangkok—site of the Bangkok Declaration, which states, *inter alia*,

> "Inaugurating the extraordinary plenary meetings of the Council, His Excellency General Prem Tinsulanonda, Prime Minister of Thailand, stated that the major obstacle to the realization of Namibia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity had been the continued illegal occupation of that country by South Africa. He reiterated Thailand's full support for the legitimate cause and struggle of the Namibian people, represented by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)." [*S/16601, annex, para. 5.*]

81. The position of Thailand with regard to the question of Namibia has been clear and consistent. My Government condemns the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by the Pretoria régime in the strongest possible terms and unreservedly supports the efforts of the United Nations to bring about genuine self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia with full sovereign rights over its natural resources in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions, particularly Council resolution 435 (1978). Moreover, Thailand condemns, in no uncertain terms, the practice of *apartheid* in South Africa and Namibia and demands an immediate and unconditional end to such racist policies and abhorrent practices. My delegation also denounces the Pretoria régime's insistence on the so-called linkage of the Namibian question to the extraneous issue of Cuban troops in Angola. Furthermore, we strongly condemn South African use of Namibian territory for launching military attacks against and incursions into the neighbouring States, such as the recent raids at Cabinda deep inside Angola and at Gaborone in Botswana, as well as aggressive actions by South Africa against other States in the region. Such actions constitute brazen violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those States.

82. My delegation joins with the international community in resolutely denouncing South Africa's measures to establish a so-called interim government in Namibia. My delegation is of the view that this latest move by the Pretoria régime is designed to delay the implementation of the United Nations plan, and will only prolong the agony of the oppressed Namibian people. The United Nations plan, as approved by resolution 435 (1978), remains the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the issue. Its unconditional implementation, without further prevarication by South Africa, is essential to ensure a just and lasting solution to this problem, which has for too long made a mockery of fundamental principles and elementary justice. Pending such a solution, my delegation supports the continuation of the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole authentic representative, to achieve their goals.

83. My delegation takes note, with appreciation, of the further report of the Secretary-General, which sums up the current impasse as follows:

> "As members of the Security Council are aware, in my report to the Council on 29 August 1983 [*S/15943*], I stated that in regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), virtually all outstanding issues had been resolved as far as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group was concerned. However, I also made clear in that report that the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban

troops as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still made it impossible to launch the United Nations plan. There has been no change in the position of South Africa in regard to this particular issue. In the prevailing circumstances, it is with regret that I must report that it has not yet proven possible to finalize arrangements for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia." [*S/17242, para. 45.*]

Again, in his report, the Secretary-General states:

"The prevailing difficulties have been compounded and given a new dimension by the recent decision of South Africa to establish an interim government in Namibia. I consider it most important that the Government of South Africa, in the interest of the people of Namibia as a whole, as well as in the wider interests of the region, should reconsider carefully the implications of its decision, and desist from any actions which would contravene the relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978). It is imperative that all concerned respect the provisions of the United Nations plan which is binding on the parties, and remains the only agreed basis for the independence of Namibia." [*Ibid., para 47.*]

84. The Council is therefore facing an enormous challenge in dealing with the defiant Pretoria régime. We owe it to ourselves, and indeed we owe it to the Namibian people, to exert every effort to overcome the duplicity and the intransigence of South Africa, in keeping with our cherished principles, with our commitment to justice and with the dignity of man. It is the primary responsibility of this Council to ensure the speedy attainment of Namibia's independence. For its part, my delegation will continue Thailand's steadfast support for the people of Namibia in their quest for sovereignty and independence in a united Namibia.

85. Finally, I should like to take the opportunity to express my delegation's deep gratitude for the kind words addressed by many distinguished delegates to Thailand and its representatives for our role as President of the Council last month.

86. Mr. MAXEY (United Kingdom): It gives my delegation special pleasure, Sir, to see Trinidad and Tobago, a fellow member of the Commonwealth, occupying the presidency with such distinction. It is an honour for the Council, as well as acknowledgement of the importance of the current debate, that you should have decided to preside over it personally.

87. I want also to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the representative of Thailand for their exemplary conduct of the Council's proceedings in May.

88. Neither Thailand nor Trinidad and Tobago have previously served as President of the Council; both, if I may say so, fulfil the task as to the manner born.

89. Botswana, like Trinidad and Tobago, is a Commonwealth country. With Botswana, as with your own country, Mr. President, the United Kingdom has enjoyed for many years the warmest and friendliest ties. Botswana, like Trinidad and Tobago, represents no threat to anyone, has never attacked anyone and manifestly has no intention, nor indeed means, of attacking anyone.

90. In London, early today, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made clear to the South African ambassador the very serious view which the British Government takes of South Africa's attack on Botswana in the early hours of this morning. He strongly condemned the violation of the sovereignty of a fellow Commonwealth country and deplored this further use of violence which has resulted in much loss of life and injury. Sir Geoffrey Howe told Mr. Worrall that the British Government regarded the attack as indefensible, the more so given the earlier diplomatic exchanges between the Governments of Botswana and South Africa on security matters. The South African ambassador was asked to report these views to his Government and to communicate to them the widespread concern and shock with which reports of this incident have been received in Britain.

91. The Council is aware of my Government's long-standing opposition to all acts of violence. We ourselves have been the victim of such acts. We deplore attempts at political assassination. But in no way does this justify South Africa's behaviour in Gaborone today. I should like to repeat in the Council the sympathy and support which we have already expressed directly to the Government of Botswana.

92. The operation undertaken by South Africa against Botswana is unacceptable, short-sighted and cannot but have a counter-productive effect on the peace and stability in the region which South Africa claims to desire. The same is true of the recent and similar operation by the South African Defence Force (SADF) in northern Angola, which my Government equally deplores.

93. I am aware that the Council has been asked to hold a separate meeting on this latter subject, which is indeed distinct from Namibia. Nevertheless, I must say a few words on it before turning to the matter in hand.

94. As my delegation said in the Council during previous debates on Namibia, in 1983, the question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is a separate issue from the matter before us today, which is the implementation of a Namibian settlement. The security of Angola is a sovereign matter for the Angolan Government; it is not for the Council to tell Angola how to conduct its own affairs. The Council has no role in any negotiations which may take place on that matter, unless, that is, we are invited by those concerned to participate. That said, perhaps I may follow the lead of others in expressing the United Kingdom's deep concern about the activities of SADF personnel inside Angola. The implementation of South Africa's decision to withdraw those forces which had been occupying the southern part of Angola was a hopeful sign. My Government had never accepted their right to be on Angolan territory in the first place; but the Lusaka Agreement and the withdrawal which was recently completed seemed to offer the prospect

of a reduction of tension on the northern borders of Namibia. This could only have been helpful to the prospects for implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is therefore all the more disturbing that we should now have to take account of the serious incident in Cabinda. We unequivocally condemn such violations of sovereignty. We have expressed our strong views to the South African Government. The involvement of South African military personnel in Cabinda is both unacceptable in itself and an extremely unhelpful development in the context of the Namibia negotiations.

95. Turning now to the subject of this debate, I would like to join those who have expressed appreciation to the Prime Minister of Peru and to the many other ministers who have come to New York. I would also like to welcome once again the President of SWAPO. The time and trouble taken by high-level representatives, who bear many other pressing burdens, in order to contribute to our present deliberations has underlined the significance of this debate and of the Council's work in relation to Namibia.

96. In his most interesting statement, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon looked at the question of Namibia in a broad context. Like other speakers, he underlined the special responsibility of the Council. He rightly expressed concern about the functioning of multilateral organizations and public confidence in them. He said:

> "Thus the Namibian problem is a shared and universal challenge. It should not be confused with issues that are strategic and limited in nature. This is not an ideological battle between the East and the West; even less is it a North-South confrontation." [*2585th meeting, para. 99.*]

97. Those are sentiments which my delegation endorses unreservedly. We shall not resolve the question of Namibia if we stand divided. We must not allow Namibia to be used to create differences between members of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole. For Namibia is indeed a common challenge, and the strength of our approach to it is that all members of the Council have accepted a proposal for a Namibian settlement and that all Member States agree that Namibia should be brought to independence at the earliest possible date.

98. Council resolution 435 (1978) is central to the process of achieving self-determination for Namibia and is central to this debate. It is our responsibility to ensure that nothing is done by the Council to undermine its own achievement in adopting resolution 435 (1978).

99. It was above all for this reason that my Government, like other contact-group Governments which first sponsored the United Nations settlement proposal, expressed deep concern in April when the South African Government was considering the proposal made by some of the Namibian internal parties for a transitional government. We told the South African Government that we would regard any unilateral measures taken by South Africa in relation to the establishment of constitutional bodies and to the transfer of power in Namibia as null and void. We said that any arrangements that could be established as a result of such measures would have no status whatsoever under the United Nations settlement plan. We made clear that the South African Government's responsibility to bring about the implementation of the United Nations plan could not be delegated to any Namibian party [*see S/17120, annex*].

100. For the same reason, the United Kingdom gave its full support to the statement made by the President of the Council on 3 May [*S/17151*] in which he reiterated that the members of the Council rejected any unilateral action leading towards an internal settlement as unacceptable.

101. The South African Government proposes to put its new interim mechanism into effect in the very near future. It will do so in the knowledge that—as previous speakers, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, have pointed out—it has no support from any Member State for that move. It is right that, through the statements of individual members and the statement by the President of the Security Council on 3 May, the South African Government should have been left in no doubt that the path to an internationally accepted settlement under resolution 435 (1978) cannot be circumvented by the promulgation of an internal settlement. This is a point which can usefully be reinforced in the draft resolution which is now under discussion between members of the Council [*S/17270*].

102. As I said earlier, resolution 435 (1978) is central to this debate. As the helpful report submitted by the Secretary-General [*S/17242*] demonstrates, the situation has not been static for the past two years. The Secretary-General himself has made determined and persistent efforts to press forward towards implementation. He has described in his report the many consultations which he has undertaken, and it is right that we should express our appreciation to him and to his Special Representative for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari. The Secretary-General has also described, in paragraph 31, the communication which he received from the President of Angola on 17 November 1984 [*S/16838*], following bilateral discussions between the Government of Angola and the United States. We have since listened with close attention to the pertinent statement in this debate by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola [*2586th meeting*].

103. In the conclusions to his report, the Secretary-General does not disguise the fact that the difficulties surrounding implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have recently been compounded. He says that it is imperative that all concerned should respect the provisions of the United Nations plan, which is binding on the parties and remains the only agreed basis for the independence of Namibia.

104. This is surely the consideration which must be uppermost in our minds when we consider the outcome of our proceedings. We must consider whether a particular course of action will make implementation more likely or less likely. We must not act in a way which jeopardizes the plan or which could entail further delay. It has been suggested by some, given that negotiating has been such a prolonged and

frustrating process, that we should now give up further efforts at negotiation. This would surely be a tragic error. The alternative to negotiations would be to relapse into conflict. That would increase and prolong the suffering of all Namibians, whether inside or outside the Territory. That cannot and must not be the objective of the Security Council. It is our responsibility to secure Namibian independence at the earliest possible date on a just and internationally acceptable basis. Such a basis exists in resolution 435 (1978).

105. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania emphasized [*2583rd meeting*], resolution 435 (1978) retains its intrinsic validity. I note in this connection that the representative of South Africa expressed [*ibid.*] confidence that the people of Namibia would before too long be able to move forward to internationally recognized independence. We, together with the other members of the international community, are waiting for the South African Government to demonstrate the good faith of their undertaking. We urge the South African Government to act. It is not only its clear responsibility; it is in its own interests to bring about Namibia's independence on the basis of the settlement plan which has the support of the entire international community.

106. This, therefore, is the answer to the questions which were posed by the representative of South Africa concerning the Council's wishes for Namibia. He asked whether we preferred that total power should reside in the hands of one man, the Administrator-General. The answer, of course, is "No". We would prefer that total power should be transferred at once, through the mechanism of the settlement plan, to an independent and democratically elected government representing all the people of Namibia. I accordingly hope that we shall succeed in finding a constructive outcome to this debate which gives a new impetus and a new urgency to our efforts to implement resolution 435 (1978).

107. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Mr. Laetare Basile Guissou, to whom I extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Council.

108. Mr. GUISSOU (Burkina Faso) (*interpretation from French*): I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. My delegation is happy to see you in this very important post and is convinced that you will conduct the present debate successfully. I note that your country, too, has suffered in the past from the unspeakable evils of colonialism and foreign domination.

109. On behalf of my delegation I congratulate also the representative of Thailand on the competent and skilful manner in which he conducted our work last month. I would ask him to convey our appreciation to my counterpart in Thailand, whose presence here demonstrated the great importance his country attaches to the role of the Council.

110. Similarly, I wish to greet all my colleagues, whose participation adds weight to the present debate, and to bid welcome here to Comrade Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.

111. The failure in January 1981 of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting of the United Nations plan may not have dashed all the hope of those who claim to believe only in the virtues of negotiations and dialogue, but it does seem to have weakened considerably our capacity to act. Four years have passed since racist South Africa inflicted that failure in Geneva on the international community. In so doing, South Africa eloquently demonstrated its firm intention of maintaining its colonial presence in Namibia at all costs. Yet, since 1966, the United Nations, weary of Pretoria's dilatory tactics, decided to put an end to South Africa's Mandate over Namibia in as official a manner as possible and to strip it of any right to administer the Territory.

112. It is interesting to note that the only constant feature of South Africa's conduct in the question of the decolonization of Namibia, which has been before the United Nations since 1946, is its constant refusal to accept the dictates of the international community and the United Nations. In 1966, South Africa replied to the United Nations decision to terminate its Mandate over Namibia by refusing to comply and by illegally maintaining its presence in Namibia. That refusal was followed shortly thereafter by a rebuff of resolution 276 (1970), wherein the Council reiterated the unlawful nature of the South African presence in Namibia. Then came the 1971 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,[2] which held, in paragraph 133, that "South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory".

113. One could cite numerous other South African rejections of United Nations authority. They are, indeed, outrageous and humiliating, but I shall mention only those which my delegation deems the most significant.

114. In resolution 385 (1976), as is known, the Council affirmed the right of the Namibian people to define its future freely and declared in paragraph 7 that "it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity".

115. Two years later, in 1978, it seemed that the way was open to the implementation of that resolution as a result of a proposal in the Council by five Western members. After that proposal, resolution 435 (1978) was adopted and a United Nations plan was set up providing for a cease-fire, elections under the supervision of the United Nations, and the creation in Namibia of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

116. What happened in the implementation of that resolution proved that the members of the Council who reflected their scepticism by abstaining in the voting or by not participating were right. The failure at Geneva seems to have put an end to any action aimed at the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan.

117. It is now up to the Council to take a stand. In this regard, it is only wise that it should take advantage of this meeting, not just to ask questions, but also, and above all, to reappraise the whole matter, lest everything it has done *vis-à-vis* Pretoria since 1966 be completely undermined.

118. The debate in the Council will be significant only if the Council is determined to succeed in its mission and musters the necessary imagination to forge ahead, something that it has failed to do in the past, when often it has only marked time. This debate must not be just another recital of the long history of the examination of the question of Namibia in the General Assembly and Security Council. This debate must pave the way for concrete action. There is no point in adding more resolutions to those already adopted if they always prove to be completely ineffective.

119. What is needed first and foremost is for the Council to take a new approach to the problem of Namibia after so many efforts wasted by the stubbornness and insolence of the racist régime in Pretoria. The Council can be helped in this task. It need merely view these meetings as a necessary stage—as a time for stock-taking, for reappraising the many reasons why it has failed over these many years.

120. In 1981, when the Council met while South Africa had just gone to Geneva to deny its recent commitments—placing its allies in a most uncomfortable position—the Council was divided and did not adopt the draft resolution submitted to it [*S/14462*], even though in the course of that debate not one single State recognized the occupation of Namibia as legal or in conformity with the elementary norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

121. I might remind the Council here of the result of the voting on that draft resolution, whereby the Council was preparing to impose an arms embargo on South Africa. It was as follows: 12 in favour, 3 opposed—France, the United Kingdom and the United States—and no abstentions [*2277th meeting*]. The message from that triple veto was clear and it was clearly received. We wonder whether the authors today are as unshakeable in the convictions which prompted them to take so negative a position as soon as it became a matter of implementing Chapter VII of the Charter.

122. The Secretary-General, in his further report concerning the implementation of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) of the Security Council on the question of Namibia [*S/17242*], described for the Council the evolution of the situation since his report of 29 December 1983 [*S/16237*]. The conclusion to be drawn from this report is no different from the conclusion that the Secretary-General himself drew: that there has been no change in South Africa's position on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, withdrawal which it considers to be a precondition to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

123. The Pretoria régime, while claiming to support resolution 435 (1978), is really looking for a new formula to replace the settlement provided by the said resolution. The intention is clear and significant: the Pretoria régime has decided to set up an alleged interim government in Namibia, which is but one additional stalling tactic.

124. The Council must support the Secretary-General in his efforts. Each report of the Secretary-General on Namibia must henceforth be the subject of an official meeting of the Council, in the course of which the Council, drawing appropriate conclusions from the reports submitted to it, will take the initiative and promote further action to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and thereby bring about progress towards the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

125. The Council must tolerate the situation in Namibia no longer, especially since that situation is clearly a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace and an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. It is time for the Council to stop reacting passively to Pretoria's actions, as it has done in the past. By calling for a search for solutions to the Namibian question, which already exist, Pretoria wishes to gain time: the time it needs to build in Namibia a second South Africa, to its taste and faithful to it.

126. My country's position on "linkage" is well known. Burkina Faso has always rejected the artificial link which South Africa has tried to establish between unrelated situations; in this delaying manoeuvre it is supported by the United States.

127. We sincerely believe that the Namibian people itself must write its own history by winning its independence through struggle.

128. Logically speaking, South Africa, which oppresses its own people, must inevitably oppress other peoples beyond its territory. A régime which denies its people their most basic rights cannot claim to recognize those same rights for other peoples. That is why South Africa commits acts of aggression, murder and massacre in Angola, Botswana and elsewhere.

129. Independence for Namibia is inevitable. Freedom and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence will triumph in South Africa and in Namibia. Does the Council wish to move with the tide of history or to go against it? That is the only question our conscience impels us to ask. Nothing more can be expected from Pretoria, which has more than benefited from the culpable silence and thinly disguised support of certain members of the Council.

130. Today we hope only to see each member of the Council take a clear stand on the nature of its conscious political attitude towards Pretoria, which even further encourages it to flout with impunity human rights and, above all, the rights of peoples.

131. Burkina Faso is convinced that the obstacles faced by Namibia's decolonization process will in no way alter the evolution of that process or its conclusion, which will be the triumph of the liberation struggle courageously waged by

the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, its sole, authentic representative. We are convinced, too, that that triumph can be hastened by the imposition by the Council of binding sanctions against South Africa.

132. Thus convinced, we have already appealed to all those who only recently opposed the adoption of draft resolution S/14462, which was before the Council at its 2277th meeting, in April 1981, to cease their opposition to the adoption of binding sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

133. We make that appeal not only to speed Namibia's achievement of genuine independence, but also, and above all, so that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will no longer be scorned, and so that sincere democrats, patriots and revolutionaries will no longer languish in South African gaols.

134. We in Burkina Faso are pleased that the question of Namibia has gone beyond the narrow framework of national administrations, and is increasingly commanding the political support of public opinion, particularly in countries whose policies and practices have not always been in accord with relevant United Nations resolutions and decisions. To our mind this is vastly important, and confirms the truth that the struggles of peoples everywhere are always mutually supportive.

135. Homeland or death: We shall prevail!

136. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Afghanistan. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

137. Mr. ZARIF (Afghanistan): I should like at the outset, Sir, to express the warm congratulations of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June. We are confident that, with your distinguished personal and diplomatic qualities, you will fulfil your responsibilities with great distinction, and will guide the work of the Council towards success.

138. Let me also pay a tribute to the representatives of Thailand for the manner in which they conducted the work of the Council during the month of May.

139. Almost 19 years have elapsed since, on 27 October 1966, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 2145 (XXI), by which it terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of Namibia and assumed direct responsibility for that Territory. By its resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, the General Assembly established the United Nations Council for Namibia to administer the Territory as the sole legal authority and to guide the people of Namibia towards the achievement of full independence.

140. In the face of arrogant defiance by the racist colonialist régime of South Africa of those and subsequent General Assembly resolutions, an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was sought with a view to verifying whether or not the United Nations was legally and politically authorized to assume direct responsibility for the Territory by terminating South Africa's Mandate, which had been conferred upon it by the League of Nations. In its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971,[2] the International Court of Justice stated in no ambiguous terms that the decisions of the General Assembly were in full conformity with the principles of the international legal system.

141. Over the years since then, the Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted scores of resolutions calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal by South Africa of its colonial administration and its armed forces of occupation from Namibian territory.

142. In order to put an end to the depletion of Namibia's rich natural resources by the colonial Power and the capitalist transnational corporations, the United Nations Council for Namibia enacted its Decree No. 1[1] on 27 September 1974.

143. Faced with the stubborn refusal of the *apartheid* régime to abide by United Nations resolutions, the Security Council adopted its resolutions 418 (1977) and 473 (1980), imposing military sanctions against South Africa.

144. Yet no meaningful, tangible step could be taken towards the implementation of those resolutions which could bring closer the attainment by Namibians of independence. South Africa's colonial administration and armed forces still remain in Namibia; extensive economic and military assistance from imperialist countries continues to be rendered to the *apartheid* régime; oppression and suppression of the Namibian people continue to increase; and the plunder of Namibian natural and human resources by the colonial authorities and capitalist transnational monopolies continues to drain Namibia of whatever still remains in that unfortunate land. What causes great concern is that the international community seems to have no foreseeable chance of putting an immediate end to this shameful and deplorable situation.

145. Obviously, the key party responsible for the continuation of the present situation in Namibia is the abhorrent racist régime of South Africa, which, relying on the use of brute force and repression within Namibia and on piratic acts of aggression and intimidation against the front-line States, is out to perpetuate its colonial hold over Namibia. That could not, however, mislead the international community into ignoring detrimental factors which are at work and which exist not in Namibia or in South Africa, but in the United States and some other imperialist countries.

146. Further evidence continues to surface proving beyond any reasonable doubt repeated violations of relevant United Nations resolutions and of Decree No. 1 of the United Nations Council for Namibia by some of the very same countries that voted in favour of those documents.

147. The decision of the European Community to extend economic assistance to the occupying Power in Namibia and the provision of loans to the racist régime of South Africa through some international financial institutions

have not only failed to help the overwhelming majority of South Africans and Namibians, but have ultimately resulted in the diversion of greater resources by the South African racist clique for further arming of the oppressive warmongering machine of *apartheid*. This is evident from the fact that since 1984 the Pretoria régime has increased its military expenditure by an annual average of 20 per cent.

148. Apart from the huge quantities of military and other related items acquired from certain imperialist countries and the Zionist régime of Israel, the South African racist, colonialist régime has been able to establish, with the help and co-operation of its allies, a large network of military industries.

149. There are persistent reports on the existence of secret military and security arrangements between the Government of South Africa and some Member States, and of plans to establish a so-called South Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the participation of the Pretoria régime, to defend imperialist interests in the southern hemisphere. Of serious and great concern also are the sufficiently credible reports on South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability and its continuing plans for producing and perfecting chemical, biological (bacteriological) weapons. Should those reports prove to be consistent with reality, the threat posed by the racist régime of South Africa to the security of the whole area would acquire a new and far-reaching dimension, which would inevitably result in a sharp deterioration of the international security climate.

150. There is no doubt that those plans could not have materialized had it not been for the diplomatic, economic and military collaboration extended to the racist régime by some imperialist States—at the top of the list, the United States, which is engaged in its shameless and treacherous policy of so-called constructive engagement with the racist régime. It is no wonder that the outlawed régime finds it possible to confront the overwhelming majority of mankind, in total defiance of the verdict of the international community.

151. The arrogant disregard of international public opinion by the racist Pretoria régime thus has its roots not only in the criminal and horrific nature of the *apartheid* system, but also in the policy of those quarters that have practically identified themselves with the perpetrators of that system—namely, the United States and some of its imperialist allies.

152. Greatly alarmed by the lack of a foreseeable solution and by a sharp turn for the worse of the prevailing situation in Namibia, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries held an Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting at New Delhi from 19 to 21 April 1985 to evaluate the situation in and relating to Namibia. In its declaration [*see S/17184 and Corr.1, annex*], the Bureau called upon the Security Council to act in a decisive manner in fulfilment of the direct responsibility of the United Nations with regard to Namibia and to take urgent measures in order to ensure that the United Nations plan, as approved in resolution 435 (1978), is immediately and effectively implemented, without modification or pre-condition. The Bureau strongly condemned the Pretoria régime's decision to install a so-called internal administration in Windhoek, which made it all the more imperative that the Security Council meet forthwith, assume its responsibilities fully and ensure the speedy and unconditional implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

153. If the present ominous trend continues unchecked, the international community will ultimately have to face a situation in which the achievement of a settlement will be far less possible than it may appear to be today.

154. There are certain elements which lie at the core of the present situation in Namibia. I wish to underline them.

155. First, the question of Namibia is, in the complete sense of the word, a decolonization problem. As such, it is an issue between the people of Namibia, represented by SWAPO, and the international community, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, on the one hand, and the racist régime of South Africa, as the occupying Power, on the other. To try to explain this issue in the context of East-West confrontation would be a futile attempt aimed at undermining the total applicability to Namibia of the principle of the right of all nations to self-determination and independence.

156. Secondly, on the basis of the Definition of Aggression contained in resolution 3314 (XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1974, the continued occupation of Namibia by South African forces constitutes a clear act of aggression. The people of Namibia are thus entitled to wage all forms of struggle, including armed struggle, to rid their Territory of the occupation forces. At the same time, all patriotic elements who have been captured in the course of this struggle by the racist occupying Power must therefore enjoy the status of prisoners-of-war, in conformity with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949.[5]

157. Thirdly, SWAPO is the sole legitimate and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and the vanguard of their struggle for total independence. Thus, any attempt to win recognition and legitimacy for the puppet subservient local authorities to be officially installed in Windhoek as the so-called interim government, totally violates the provisions of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978).

158. Fourthly, resolution 435 (1978) constitutes the only basis for the settlement of the Namibian problem. Any attempt by the so-called Western contact group, or from any other quarter, to qualify, modify or amend that resolution or to introduce into it extraneous and irrelevant issues of so-called linkage, parallelism or reciprocity constitutes a grave violation of that resolution. The designs of the United States and South Africa to tie the Namibian settlement to the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist contingent from Angola is therefore in total defiance of that resolution and is aimed at delaying the achievement of a solution to the problem.

159. Fifthly, the United Nations Council for Namibia is the sole legal Administering Authority for Namibia. Therefore, any attempt to deny the authority of the United Nations as the heir of the League of Nations in order to alter

the legal status of the Territory or to portray the issue as a territorial or regional issue runs counter to the international legal system and provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

160. Sixthly, under Security Council resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978 and General Assembly resolution S-9/2 of 3 May 1978, the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia unquestionably includes Walvis Bay and the Penguin and other offshore islands. Any attempts to separate those areas from mainland Namibia are thus illegal and null and void.

161. Seventhly, since the Government of South Africa has consistently defied the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and by doing so has violated the obligations it assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council can and must, in our opinion, impose without further delay comprehensive, mandatory sanctions against that Government under Chapter VII of the Charter and set a timetable for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia.

162. The Government of Afghanistan believes that the international community should allow no further time for the delaying tactics of the racist régime of South Africa and its imperialist collaborators. All forms of assistance and co-operation should be extended to SWAPO and the African National Congress of South Africa and to the front-line States, particularly Angola, Botswana and Mozambique, with a view to enabling them to intensify their struggle against the colonial rule of South Africa in Namibia, for the eradication of the inhuman *apartheid* system in South Africa and for the defence of their territories against the repeated acts of aggression and destabilization perpetrated by the régime of Pretoria.

163. We wish to put on record our appreciation to the Secretary-General and the United Nations Council for Namibia for the untiring efforts they are making on behalf of the international community to achieve early independence for Namibia and its people.

164. In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to thank you, and through you all the members of the Council, for affording an opportunity to my delegation to express its views to the Council.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NOTES

[1] Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted by the United Nations Council for Namibia on 27 September 1974 (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24* (A/35/24), vol. I, annex II.

[2] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971*, p. 16.

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirth-ninth Session, Supplement No. 24* (A/39/24).

[4] A/40/213 and Corr.1.

[5] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, No. 972.

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